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I. INTRODUCTION
In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation'
the U.S. Supreme Court held that citizens may not bring
actions against dischargers for "wholly past" violations
of an NPDES permit. In the Fall 1988 issue of this Environ-
mental Law Journal, a scholarly analysis of not only of why
Gwaltney was correctly decided, but why it should be
extended to limit government prosecutions for past vio-
lations was provided.2 As impressive (and impassioned)
as that analysis is, it is probably a good idea to let Texas
lawyers know that there may be less to Gwaltney than
meets the eye; it certainly does not provide all the com-
fort industrial dischargers might think. In fact, the Gwalt-
ney decision is dumb, largely useless, and creates a pro-
cedural mess that can only result in increased litigation.
I1. BACKGROUND
A little background to the Gwaltney decision may be in
order for Clean Water Act novices. Underthe Clean Water
Act, all facilities that discharge pollutants into navigable
waters (broadly defined) are required to obtain and comply
with a National Discharge Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System ("N PDES") permit.3 Violation of the conditions
of the permit, especially the effluent limitations that place
restrictions on the quantity of pollutants that may be dis-
charged, subject the permittee to a potential injunction
or civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation.
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Proof of violation of a permit is very simple; permittees
are required to monitor and report the quantity of pollu-
tants in theirdischarge. If their report shows that they have
exceeded their permit limits, they are in a bit of potential
trouble.
Pursuant to section 309, an enforcement action may be
brought in federal court by the federal government.5 Con-
gress, however, did not completely trust the government
effectively to enforce the Act, and the Clean Water Act also
contains, in section 505, a "citizen suit" provision that
authorizes any citizen "adversely affected" to bring an
action for violation of the permit.6 In the early days of the
Reagan administration, there was widespread perception
that enforcing pollution control laws was not high on the
government's agenda, and environmental groups began
a concerted effort to identify and sue major violators.
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Remember, proof of violation is very simple (and attorney's
fees may be awarded).
Although the citizen suits were largely successful (and
usually settled with agreements by the discharger to
improve their pollution control equipment), a number of
defendants argued that citizens could not bring actions
for past violations of N PDES permits. The basic argument
was that section 505 only authorizes actions against per-
sons who are "in violation" of the Act. Present tense, get
it. The circuits split. One court said citizens could not sue
for past violations;8 one court said citizens could sue for
past violations;9 one court said citizens could sue for past
violations only if they were part of an intermittent but ongo-
ing pattern of violations.0
Which brings us finally to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gwaltney. Justice Marshall writing for the Court, held that
section 505 does not authorize citizen suits for "wholly
past" violations of the Clean Water Act. He held, however,
that good faith allegations of ongoing or intermittent vio-
lations were sufficient to state ajusticiable claim. Justice
Scalia, concurring with the holding that the Act does not
authorize citizen actions for wholly past violations, dis-
agreed that good faith allegations were sufficient to estab-
lish jurisdiction. He believed that the factual basis of the
complaint could be challenged as part of a motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Ill. PROBLEMS WITH GWALTNEY
Gwaltney on its face seems to limit the ability of citizens
(environmentalists are citizens) to enforce the Clean Water
Act when the federal and state governments are not acting.
Industrial dischargers may take heart from Gwaltney, I
wouldn't if I were you. Gwaltney is a mess.
A. It's Dumb
The opinion does limit the ability of citizens to sue for
"past" violations of N PDES permits. This limitation is fair
and sensible isn't it? If permit violations are past and over
with why should citizens be able to sue?
I do not know about you, but where I live, people believe
that enforcing laws has a deterrent effect, not only on the
violator, but on others. It has been a long time since I heard
anyone argue that a murderer should not be prosecuted
if he promised never to do it again. I'm not advocating cap-
ital punishment for NPDES permit violations, but it seems
clear that part of the deterrent effect of the Clean Water
Act has been weakened by Gwaltney. There is no point,
however, in crying over spilt pollutants. The Supreme Court
has spoken, and the Supreme Court is always right.
In the Fall 1988 Journal article, it is argued that even the
government should be precluded from bringing enforce-
ment actions for past violations of the Clean Water Act!'
That issue, however, may be moot. The author recognizes
that the government in 1987 was given clear authority to
assess administrative penalties for "wholly past" viola-
tions. 2 If it is a comfort to have to pay administrative penal-
ties rather than civil penalties, then take comfort.
B. It's Useless (Or At Least Less Useful Than You
Might Think)
Although Gwaltney precludes citizen suits for "wholly
past" permit violations, the question remains as to what
it means to say that a violation is "wholly past!' Justice
Marshall recognizes jurisdiction fora citizen suit for"con-
tinuous or intermittent" violations. According to Justice
Scalia:
The phrase in section 505(a), "to be in violation,"
unlike the phrase "to be violating" or "to have com-
mitted a violation" suggest a state rather than an
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act - the opposite of the state of compliance. A good
or lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is the
dubious state in which a past effluent problem is not
recurring at the moment but the cause of that prob-
lem has not been completely and clearly eradicated.3
Thus, the fact that a discharger is not currently in viola-
tion does not mean that a citizen suit cannot be brought.
A pattern of past violations, which is usually the case in
citizen suits, may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Consider the nature of the cases in which this issue arose.
In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock,4 a citizen suit was
brought because a leak in an oil pipeline that occurred in
January 1983, resulted in contamination of a creek on
plaintiff's property. Not your typical NPDES case.5 The
Fifth Circuit held that under section 505 the plaintiff did
not have jurisdiction to bring a citizen suit for a past vio-
lation. However, a holding that citizens cannot sue under
section 505 for a single, past leak in a pipeline says very
little about the scope of section 505
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In Pawtuxet Cove Marina v. Ciba-Geigy,7 the plaintiffs
located downstream of the defendant brought a citizen
suit alleging violations of the defendant's NPDES permit.
In this case, the defendant had completely ceased oper-
ating under the permit, since it had tied in to a municipal
sewage treatment system. The court of appeals held that
the citizen suit could be brought if the plaintiff "fairly
alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not
enjoined, will again proceed to violate the Act."18 The court
concluded that in this case, since the defendant had
stopped discharging completely, a likelihood of continu-
ing violations did not exist. It may be small comfort to know
that citizens cannot bring an enforcement action if you
are no longer discharging.9
Gwaltney itself raises the tough factual situation. In Gwalt-
ney, the defendant had repeatedly violated the conditions
of the permit by exceeding effluent limitations on five of
the seven pollutants covered. The defendant had, however,
installed new pollution control equipment after these vio-
lations. The issue was whether this new equipment com-
pletely corrected the problem that had caused the earlier
violations, thus rendering them "wholly past." Although
the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction does not exist
for past violations, both Justice Marshall and Justice
Scalia suggested that on these facts it is quite likely that
jurisdiction would exist. Justice Scalia phrased the issue
on remand as whether the defendant "had taken remedial
steps that had clearly achieved the effect of curing all past
violations by the time suit was brought'
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On remand, the district court found that the plaintiffs had
satisfied the Gwaltney test.21 Even though remedial
actions by the defendant had, in fact, eliminated the cause
of violations, the court found that at the time the suit was
filed, there was legitimate uncertainty as to whether vio-
lations would recur.2 2 Thus, the plaintiff had established
citizen suit jurisdiction, and the penalties were reinstated.
(At least Gwaltney's lawyers can tell their client that they
won a moral victory.)
In fact, virtually all of the cases decided since Gwaltney
have concluded that the citizen suit should not be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction.23 One court has even held
that once jurisdiction is established for intermittent or on-
going violations a court may assess penalties for wholly
past violations.
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Thus, the fact that a discharger is not caught in the act
of polluting is probably not going to mean much in defeat-
ing a citizen suit. In order to prevent citizen suit jurisdic-
tion after a pattern of violations, a facility had better take
serious steps to make sure a violation cannot reoccur. If
those steps are taken after the filing of the citizen suit,
it may be too late.
C. It's Messy
Consider the problems that Gwaltney now creates. Jus-
tice Marshall states that a good faith allegation of inter-
mittent noncompliance is sufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion, but Justice Marshall does indicate that the facts of
that allegation may be contested in a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. Justice Scalia would have the facts
directly contestable in a motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. In either event, imagine the nature
of a trial for NPDES permit violations.
Citizen suit litigation will now require the court to deter-
mine, as a jurisdictional matter, whether a particular type
of pollution control equipment has "clearly achieved the
effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was
brought."25 Can you imagine the time that will be wasted
on convincing the court of technical issues about the
prospective operation of pollution control equipment.
Incentive forthe parties to settle what previously had been
simple factual cases will be little or nonexistent. Rather
than considering remedial efforts as factors in setting
penalties, judges will be forced actually to adjudicate
whether pollution control equipment is "clearly" adequate.
After a discharger has lost on this issue, how will a court
feel when it comes time to consider penalties? I frankly
do not know how sympathetic courts are going to be to
polluters orcitizen plaintiffs, but I do not think either side
should feel real comfortable.
In fact, the only group that clearly benefits from all this
are the lawyers. A new layer of litigation and new compli-
cations for lawyers. Maybe Gwaltney isn't so bad after all.
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